Interview with Leah Shakdiel | Machsomwatch
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Interview with Leah Shakdiel

Interview with Leah Shakdiel

source: 
Justvision
Leah Shakdiel

Please tell me about your background and how you got involved in doing this kind of work.

I was born in 1951 in Israel; I’m a sabra [Israeli born]. My parents were religious, Zionist1 religious, pioneers who came from Poland in 1934 before World War II. My father changed his name from Mandelbaum to Shakdiel, a Hebrew name. It was a very ideologically Zionist family and they were very proud to be the first generation to work towards getting the Jewish people a state of their own. That was the big story of their life: leaving the exile, coming back, learning Hebrew, and building the land. That was the idea: building the state for the Jews.

At a certain point when I grew up, I think my internalized super-ego demanded that I too had to do something with my life. So when I looked around after the Yom Kippur War in 19732 when the Labor Party3 was collapsing and the government was imploding, it was people from my generation and my religious Zionist upbringing that set up Gush Emunim, the Bloc of the Faithful, and the whole movement to settle the Territories.4 After a short while I felt that this was not the right direction for two reasons. One, it was as if they had totally put aside all the Zionist ideals, taking in the exiles, working on education and social gaps and the like. They said at the time that the Land of Israel5 was a burning issue and that the people of Israel and their problems were going to have to wait.

Were you part of that movement originally?

I don’t think I was really part of the movement, but I did participate in the first [settler] march to Sebastia. It was sort of a popular march and I was very impressed with the idealism. It was certainly better than the middle class idea that you have to get married and have a nice home. I was very impressed, but it bothered me that they were sort of putting aside all the other ideals, and it also bothered me that they were talking about God and the Land as if there were no other people there, as if the Arab issue, the Palestinian issue, did not exist. Those people did not exist; rather, they existed but they didn’t matter. The landscape was biblical, the land was ours, and everything was very romantic. That bothered me.

In Jerusalem in the mid-70s I started going to meetings of religious intellectuals who were talking about peace. Later I realized that it was the very beginning of the coagulation of that group, which was called Oz V'Shalom, the Religious Peace Movement. The whole idea was to teach the Jewish people that there is more than one way of interpreting the Holy text and that it is wrong to say that we are commanded to just inherit the land, and that’s it. I went to the meetings. It was very stimulating, literature was disseminated, important people were speaking, and there were petitions and demonstrations and things like that but I also wanted to do something with my life, not just talk.

You see, when you’re brought up in a Zionist community, there is a term called hagshama [fulfillment]: the realization of your ideals, the application of your ideals, you have to do something on the ground. So I thought that the thing to do was to develop a different line in Zionist practice, praxis, which was going to development towns, because of the social gaps. I didn’t want to go alone; through the religious peace movement I found a very small group of people who were interested in settling in the Negev,6 inside the Green Line.7 We ended up going to a development town of Yerucham. The decision to go and live there was the most important statement I ever made with my life. Everything else developed from there. My involvement in politics, in social action, in social justice issues, in peace, human rights, in feminism, everything developed from that.

When did you first get involved in joint work?

It’s interesting. In the 1970s, the peace movement was just beginning. Peace Now was established in ’78 — that’s three years after the religious peace movement. I think that all of us were very involved in the Jewish-Israeli drama. In other words, we were arguing our heads off with fellow Jewish citizens of the State of Israel. Not that there were not Arabs in the peace movement, but they were sort of on the margins - other than the Communist Party,8 but that was not considered mainstream Zionism.

So I think that the Arabs who came first into my life in Yerucham were Bedouins.9 In ’83 or ’84, I got involved with the Bedouin issue, when I was elected to be on the town council. I was the first councilwoman in Yerucham’s history and my fellow members of the council came across a problem with the town’s sewage system. It was systematically damaged by rocks that were thrown into it by neighboring Bedouins because they wanted to cause certain areas to flood so grass would grow and graze their flocks. It was obviously an issue of water because no water was allocated to them. Somebody on the council said, “Okay let’s call the Green Patrol”, men with combat experience - a sort of semi-fascist, half-secret group working for the Ministry of Agriculture. When I heard that the solution to the problem was to bring in the Green Patrol to take care of the Bedouins, I threw a fit and I said, “If they have a water problem, it’s our business.” I convinced the mayor that it was our business to try to help them get water.

We found out that they were not able to get water was because the State declared them as squatters because it wanted their land and wanted them to move into townships. They conducted endless legal fights, lawyers got rich, nothing happened, and the bottom line is that they are stuck. The state uses that as an excuse because the state says, “If you want to consume water, you need to pay for it. Since you are not residents of any specific settlement, you can’t really be recognized as owners of a water meter, which measures how much water you have to pay for, etc.” Our mayor thought it was very stupid. We took a Bedouin man who was working for the municipality at the time, and we told him, ”Hassan, it’s going to be in your name, and that’s it.”

We arranged for there to be an opening in the water pipe between Yerucham and Dimona for them and Hassan paid for it. And as far as we know either he was selling it to the others or collecting the money or whatever. We ended up doing the same thing on the other side of Yerucham. Of course all hell broke loose. So that’s how I contacted the Association for Civil Rights in Israel concerning the rights of the Bedouins and how I got into the issue of the other Palestinian citizens of Israel,10 also Arabs from northern Israel.

My contact with Palestinians living on the other side of the Green Line started in ’86. That spring I was invited to a conference involving third-party dialogues. At the time it was illegal for Israelis to meet with PLO11 representatives. So that was the first time I participated in such a dialogue abroad, under the cover of an academic institution. Everything that preceded Oslo12 was secretive, illegal, track-two meetings. I was sort of in the backseat of that process. There were other groups too, women’s groups especially, and so this is how the contacts with Palestinians started. From there it sort of gained momentum over the years.

What made you want to participate in those meetings?

I think it was the same thing that made me go to Yerucham. Of course you need theories and you need the big politics, but it also has to be hands on, on the ground things need to happen between people, educators, whoever . I just need to be there, on the ground. It’s got to be done.

I come from a family where part of the story is the oral history of persecution of the Jews, the oral history of the great Torah life of my family that was completely destroyed on both sides in the Holocaust.13 But my parents were part of a trailblazing generation. They broke new ground, they said, “Okay, we have this historia lacrimosa, but that’s not all there is in life for us.” It’s not as if we forget anything, we don’t. But while keeping account of our past, we also want to do the optimistic work of building a living, palpable future in the land. You see, Zionism was a big bet! It’s not as if anything was secured in advance, it was a very important bet to make that there’s going to be a future - if we cast all our weight in one direction, it’s going to happen.

Taking a step back and taking off our weight from that, for me it’s complete and total lunacy. What I find horrendous is that [the settlers] sit there in Gush Katif14 and repeat those same lines as if it was 1937 now, or even 1957. Come on, people - wake up! You’re a generation late, or even two generations late. You can’t repeat the same rhetoric. The situation the Jewish people was in then is not where the people are now. That was a different story, and the moral imbalance has changed.

What’s different about the situation?

We have a state. For me that’s a major thing. It is undeniable, we have a state; it’s a successful state. We all complain about it, it has many problems, it has a lot of unresolved issues, fine. But this is it, we have it. It’s a fact. I don’t know if this follows immediately from your question, but I don’t seek any symmetry here. It is very obvious to me that the Palestinians are a very new political and national entity in the world that doesn’t begin to compare to where I come from as a Jew.

What do you mean you don’t seek symmetry?

On the one hand, there is my people, the Jews, who are very ancient, have a very distinct identity, very different from every other people in the world, with its religion, with its language, with its ancient culture, with its rich literature, with its traditions, with its history. We can take pride in a lot of moral and ethical achievements, and this is our land. On the other hand, you have an entity that has been created on the same land recently as a result of recent events in the history of this region - the European powers meddling with it and dividing it up. How that happened is a fascinating story. It’s a very recent story.

Please describe to me the different activities that you are involved in now that are devoted to resolving the conflict.

MachsomWatch for one. The group of us who do this work in the south of the country are different. I guess it’s a combination of two things. One is that off the bat, many of the women in the south are more Zionist in their orientation - I guess maybe that’s why they live here in the first place - as compared to those MachsomWatch women in the center of the country. And there is conflict in that vein. The other issue is that the reality of the checkpoints15 in the south of the country is not as horrible as it is at, let’s say Kalandia or Hawara near Nablus.16 Now, I guess this has to do with the fact that ever since the outbreak of the second intifada17 we can’t do any checkpoint work in the Gaza Strip18 the army doesn’t allow us. I guess if we were there, it would be horrible to see how the people are not allowed to come out and get to jobs. What we see in the southern Hebron19 area is also not as terrible, it is terrible enough though.

Because we are Zionists here in the south, we do support the argument that Israel has a security problem. Many of the [MachsomWatch] women in other parts of the country really think that there should be no checkpoints, and their attitude toward the soldiers is such: no matter how humanely they try to do their job, the very fact that they’re there is a crime in and of itself. We don’t have that attitude. We keep giving the soldiers positive reinforcement about the dangerous position they are in, that they really need to screen what is going on here in terms of security threats. By and large, I must tell you that many times we end up complimenting the soldiers. They are very young, and many of them really try to minimize the friction.

What’s your goal in being present at the checkpoints?

To make sure that there is a watching eye. I think that it is very important that the military in any democracy be supervised by civil society. It’s the role of politicians up above, but the daily occurrences, the praxis, cannot be done by politicians, it’s a matter for civilians, for regular people just volunteering their time. We don’t do it enough. Often we meet Palestinians who tell us, “An hour ago, this and that happened", "Where were you yesterday?” We try to tell them that we are volunteers and we simply cannot cover twenty-four hours a day at every single checkpoint. We do what we can do. Many of us are women who have already retired from their jobs, but many of us, like myself, work— I take time off whenever I can.

I think it is also tremendously important for the soldiers to see that there is a civil society that they’re doing this for and that civil society knows and cares. It’s important for people to come and see what it’s like. It’s also very important for Palestinians to see that there are Israeli Jews who care.

I am wondering how you feel about the security issue and the checkpoints because other people I’ve interviewed have said that after witnessing what happens at Kalandia, for example, it’s hard for them to believe that it’s for the sake of security. Could you talk about that?

Look, it’s not airtight anyway. It is obvious. Terrorists are not stupid. Since the whole system is so loose, it is possible for terrorists to go through anyway. I am always surprised that those checkpoints manage every once in a while to catch somebody, because why would anybody go through a checkpoint when it’s possible to go around? I guess it is effective to a certain degree. I have a son in the army, and I think that once we have a Palestinian state the Palestinians will also have an army. The suspicion will be there, security issues will be there, and I don’t delude myself. I don’t think we’re going to get rid of the security issue so fast, and I don’t think that the army is going to be dispensable so fast. I really don’t think so.

Please tell me about the Arik Institute.

Yitzhak Frankenthal, Arik’s father, is a real bulldozer. I met him years ago, immediately after his son was killed by Hamas.20 He decided to dedicate money and time to the peace effort and he became the secretary of the religious peace movement. That’s how I met him the first time. We went together to a couple of conferences - one in Aqaba, Jordan and one in Denmark - with Palestinian educators and educators from other Arab countries. I was always really impressed with his work. I think that he is a brave man and is willing to put into effect very unusual ideas and take risks in terms of pushing things forward. He had a seminar for people on both sides and he asked me to develop a concept for peace education for that seminar, which I did.

Wherever I go, I find that the most important thing is that we do this as religious Jews. The impact is very important, because it’s so different from the image Palestinians have of religious Jews. Religious Judaism doesn’t have such a great record these days in terms of the relationships between the two communities, so it’s very important that we meddle with that. The same goes for the project that I started working for, Ma'agalei Da'at (Knowledge Circles) at Ben Gurion University.21 There happens to be money, which means that they can pay me, so it means that for the next two years I can commit myself to something steady, maybe one day a week, because I’m getting paid.

I happen to believe that the work we’re going to do is unique, working with teachers in religious Zionist high schools and yeshivas,22 both for boys and for girls. It’s a sector of Israeli society which is very difficult to introduce anything into that has to do with peace. The idea is that they should realize that they don’t know enough about Palestinians and who they are and dispense information and get them to understand what goes on. We’re not going to attack them directly by telling them to change their politics. It’s going to be a difficult experience for me because I know from experience what the starting point is when you work with people who are right-wing.

What are you doing in that project?

Depending on money, for the first year there will a meeting every week or every other week with teachers. The meetings will be study sessions and workshops that concentrate on two issues: learning about Arabs, Palestinians and Islam, and getting familiar with the spectrum that exists within Judaism about how to treat the other, so that they do not remain locked in their fanaticism, in their extremist world view that the other is the enemy, point blank, but that there are other possibilities.

Just to give an example, yesterday in the synagogue, one of the like-minded members of our synagogue showed me a passage in a book he is reading. It is an academic work about the writings of Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, the son of the famous Rav Avraham Yitzhak Kook23, the first chief rabbi of British Mandate24 Palestine who was the major spiritual leader of Gush Emunim. So the old, mainstream halachic25 line in Judaism is that Islam is not idolatry. That’s the mainstream. There are minority views, but the mainstream is that Islam, unlike Christianity, is not idolatry. That has very interesting ramifications.

Once you realize that the Muslims are not idolaters, it means that if they happen to own land in the Holy Land of Israel, well, and they happen to own land, you don’t have any religious grounds to uproot them, because they are not idolaters. They are what halacha calls ger toshav, people who live on the land whom you are supposed to take care of and protect. Very interestingly, on that particular issue, the old Rav Kook was pretty much mainstream. He argued that Muslims are not idolaters. What does the son do? In order to argue that you should actually uproot them, he says that the Arabs have recently changed and they are now idolatrous. Now that is so ridiculous.

The point is that there are too many people nowadays who are considered respectable rabbis by their flock, and this is what they preach, this is what they teach, this is where they go, this is what they believe! You tell them there are a million and a quarter, or a million and a third Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the most crowded place in the world, people there live in the most inhuman conditions, and the only answer is, “What are they doing there in the first place?” When you dig a little bit in there you say, “Where did your revered Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook get it? How did he exactly rework what his own father taught? And how come you didn’t notice that what his father said was the exact opposite and would have different implications from where you are at now?”

So in order to untie that knot, first of all, you have to know the religion. You have to be an expert in the Jewish sources, you have to bring in the experts and you have to map out a didactic strategy for how to open the minds of those people to be receptive to the idea that maybe they didn’t know it so far. But actually the old Rabbi Kook, who is considered holier than his son, actually agreed with earlier sources that the Muslims are not idolaters! How about that, black and white?! Can you just open up and know that fact? That, in and of itself, is dramatic.

I know you are just trying to use this as an example, but is the basis for expanding settlements and claiming land only justified using this idea that it should not belong to idolaters?

Let’s put it this way, it’s a classical example of cognitive dissonance. When the Jews did not have any state whatsoever, the idea was “this is our land”, like the film Exodus. A couple of generations down the line, that’s not the issue any more. So we have a hold on a certain part of our historical homeland but the problem is that every single inch of that land is physically important. It’s not enough to have a part of it and say “this is where we have our sovereignty.” If you know that there is this extra piece of it, which is much smaller than the part that you have (one fact that most Israelis don’t know is that pre-1967 territories are 22% of Mandatory Palestine, while Israel has 78%) then you need to have it because every single inch needs to be in our hands. Now you have an argument, an extra-religious argument that says that this is a problem. Before, the argument was that we didn’t have sovereignty. Now we have sovereignty so the argument is that this extra inch is a problem.

The big slogan [following the disengagement from Gaza26] is “A Jew Does Not Expel Another Jew.” Now, no matter how often you repeat that, you cannot call this expelling. When the State of Israel says that the border isn’t going to be there, it’s going to be here, and therefore you have to come home, that’s not expelling. They think that that is called expelling, and they say to the Left, “You’re the ones who are so opposed to the idea of transfer! If we try to transfer one single Palestinian family, you scream your heads off, how about the transfer of settlers?” which is of course classical right wing fascist demagoguery. You take an argument and you turn it on its head. Of course they know that we have a sovereign state, but in order to say that “Taking me from here to here means transfer,” they need to make the religious argument, because they can no longer use the argument of sovereignty.

As part of the religious community in Israel, have you faced opposition to what you’re doing?

Of course. There are two things here that jar. If you are religious you are supposed to be right-wing. If you are left-wing, you’re supposed to be secular. Now, it’s not just the fault of the religious that have moved so dramatically to the right, I think it’s also the fault of the secular Israelis who have gotten it into their heads that they can do away with their Jewish identity, with their Jewish culture. This is ridiculous.

I annoy my secular Israeli friends by telling them from every podium that if they do not see themselves as Jews that means that they are imperialists, colonialists, who have no business being here. They should leave the land to its native people. The indigenous people are Palestinians. The reason you are here is because you are a Jew! Your parents came, or your grandparents came, or you yourself came when you were younger. Don’t you remember it? You came because you were a Jew, not for any other reason. So it drives me nuts, this difficulty to see that to be a Jew has religious baggage that goes with it, a history, an ethnicity and a religion. You can be a secular Jew, you can be whatever you want, it doesn’t matter, but you cannot do away with the fact that you are a Jew.

You say that people from outside have no business here—are colonialists, imperialists—unless they are Jews. How does being Jewish justify a presence that you would otherwise deem colonial and imperial?

There are Palestinians and they share with you what you claim that you are fighting for, which is equality before the law, equal rights, human rights, civil rights, as citizens of the State of Israel. They are doing it as Palestinians who are on this side of the Green Line, and you are doing it as what exactly? It drives me nuts. So the fact that the religious cling so much to right wing politics also has to do with the fact that the Leftists don’t do very much about being Jewish, so we have a dichotomy where people feel pushed against the wall. Who are you? Are you a peacenik or a Jew?

So this dichotomy, as if being a peace seeker and being a good Jew are mutually exclusive, is a horrible thing. I think that both sides sort of participate in the maintenance of that stupidity, which goes nowhere, because unless we can recruit self-identified Jews in this country to the peace camp, we’ll get nowhere. The secularists are a real minority, and in order for the peace camp to grow, it must make inroads into what I call the self-identified Jews. The fact that they are religious or traditionalist is because there are not enough self-identified Jews who are not religious. I feel that this is what I do.

How do you navigate the dichotomy yourself?

I go crazy. I reject it completely. I say that this is not possible. I say that it is possible to find religious sources and religious role models and historic precedents for religion to be an extremely important tool for making inroads for peace, for coexistence, for human rights, for social justice. People must feel empowered, that it’s not a zero sum game. We need to provide the energy that feeds that so that people feel that it’s empowering, that it’s a well, or a fountain that opens up inside themselves, or inside their communities. I find the sources in my own tradition and in my own culture and I feel like I am growing while I am doing it. I don’t feel I am becoming smaller; it’s the other way around. I feel more courageous, I feel happier. I feel more optimistic. I feel I have more now. There’s more to life, and it’s important to do that, and you have to nurture it culturally, and I think that’s what I try to do.

How do you do that?

I teach. In my teaching I like to weave together history, text, reinterpretation, visual imagery. I like to make it rich. I like to look for parallels in Arabic culture or in Palestinian history which open up new ways for me to think about my own parents, and to tell about my own people—to share my own story. I want to share it in such a way that it resonates with people’s life experiences. I clip newspapers, I tape films from video, I use songs, texts, children’s books. I think that it’s important to keep finding new links. It’s like an infinite hypertext that you sort of swim through, and you have to make those connections. That’s what I think it is.

What’s the most important thing for you to achieve in the context of your work?

I’m 53 years old. I want to see the two-state solution 27 before I die. My parents established the Jewish state. In 1947 Palestinians didn’t understand that after the Holocaust they didn’t stand a chance. There was going to be a Jewish state one way or another, because Europe and America didn’t want to have any more Jews in such large quantities and everybody understood that those Jews needed to be dumped in Palestine. 28 So it was going to happen anyway, and the Palestinians didn’t understand it at the time, and it took more blood.

If I get to see a Palestinian state in my lifetime, it’s going to be a big thing, because it means an internal reorientation of the State of Israel, a complete reorientation, which was bound to happen. You take in the exiles, you do all those interesting experiments in populating the desert, you build an army, and then you have to reorient the whole thing by arranging it so that there is another state on the same piece of land. It’s a tremendous thing.

In July 2009 Leah sent Just Vision an update on her current work. Here is what she wrote:

I’m still with MachsomWatch and it is more and more apparent that the problem is the settlers, who continue to dictate policy to both the government and the security forces, and consequently behave violently towards Palestinians as well as peace activists like us.

During Operation Cast Lead,29 I was arrested along with five others demonstrating with Darom4Peace (South for Peace, a Jewish-Arab Negev group for coexistence) against the killing on both sides, an activity that according to the law doesn’t require a permit from the police. The police also demonstrated their patriotism by arresting us illegally. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel represented us against the Attorney General and asked them to drop all the charges. Meanwhile, the prosecution gave up the charges against us and closed the cases due to lack of interest to the public but continued with the charges against one of the students (who was arrested twice during Cast Lead, both illegally arrests) because in his case apparently there is public interest. I have since been active on issues of freedom of speech concerning monitoring and critiquing military and security activities and policies.

End.

NOTES
We have done our best to provide accurate, fair yet succinct footnotes to help you navigate the interviews. Our research team comprises more than 6 individuals, including Palestinians, Israelis and North Americans. Still, we recognize that these notes cannot capture the full complexity of this contested conflict. Therefore, we encourage you to seek additional sources of information, we welcome your feedback and appreciate your openness.

1. Zionism. The belief that the Jewish people should have a national homeland, and refuge from persecution, in Israel. Supporters of this idea are called Zionists. The Zionist Movement gained momentum in Europe in the late 1800s with the First Zionist Conference in Basel, Switzerland in 1897. The movement advocated the ideology of Zionism, a national liberation ideology of the Jewish people with several strands, foremost being the establishment of a Jewish state within the biblical Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael or Zion). See http://www.mideastweb.org/zionism.htm ^

2. War of 1973. Also referred to as the "October War," "Yom Kippur War," or "Ramadan War." A coalition of Egyptian and Syrian forces with backing by Jordan, Iraq and withfinancial support from Saudi Arabia, launched a surprise attack on Israeli forces in an attempt to regain control of the Sinai Peninsula and Golan heights which were captured by Israel during the war of 1967. While Israel suffered several military setbacks, Egyptian-Syrian efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful. However, the ability of the Egyptian troops to breach the Israeli Bar Lev line east of the Suez Canal at the beginning of the war served as a major victory for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, paving the way for his historic trip to Jerusalem in 1977 and the Camp David Accords of 1978.Online resources see Library of Congress Country Study of Israel at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iltoc.html#il0147 Scholarly resources see William L. Cleveland. A History of the Modern Middle East. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) 364-368 and ^

3. Labor Party. Mifleget Avodah in Hebrew. One of two major political parties in Israel that tends toward the center-left of the political spectrum, it emerged from the labor Zionist movement in the 1930s. Its leaders include many of the principal founders of the State of Israel, including the first Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Founded on socialist and Zionist principles, it dominated the Israeli government until 1977. Labor became the leading Israeli political party favoring territorial compromise for peace, and was the party that first officially recognized the PLO when Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres signed the Declaration of Principles and launched the Oslo Peace Process with Yasser Arafat in 1993. ^

4. Occupied Palestinian Territories. Also known as the “Territories,” “East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza”, the “Occupied Territories” or as “Judea, Samaria and Gaza.” In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this term generally refers to two non-contiguous territories captured by Israel following the war of 1967 (“June War,” “al-Nakba,” or “Six-Day War”), but does not usually include the Golan Heights. East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza are considered occupied by much of the international community and are treated as such by many international legal instruments. The Territories, or some part of, are slated to be the basis for an independent Palestine. Some members of the Israeli government refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “disputed territory,” while certain right-wing factions in Israel consider the territory an integral part of biblical Israel and thus modern political Israel. See “International Law and ‘Occupied’/ ‘Disputed’ Territory Debate” and “War of 1967.” ^

5. land of yisrael. (Sorry, there was an error; this glossary term was not found.) ^

6. Negev. Desert comprising the southern one-third of Israel. ^

7. Green Line. Refers to the 1949 Armistice Line following the war of 1948. Demarcated unofficial boundaries for the cessation of hostilities between Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. Following the 1967 war, it denotes, in most international opinion and UN resolutions, the boundary between territory recognized as part of the legitimate, sovereign State of Israel and the Occupied Territories. ^

8. Communist Party of Israel (Maki). Founded in 1948, the Communist Party of Israel (Maki) developed from the remnants of the Communist Party of pre-1948 Palestine. It has both Jewish and Arab membership. It was one of the first Israeli groups to establish contact abroad with individuals active in the Palestinian resistance and actively recruited Palestinian members. The Communist Party of Israel held seats in the First through Seventh Knessets. Following the Seventh Knesset, however, the party split, leading to the formation of the New Communist List (Rakah). Rakah became and is today the leading faction within the coalition of Hadash (the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), which has held seats from the Eighth Knesset onward, either as a single party or part of a coalition. In 1989, Rakah changed its name to Maki, thus taking back the name of the original Communist Party of Israel. See the Communist Party of Israel: http://www.maki.org.il/english/english.html. Also see the Knesset profile of the Communist Party of Israel http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=72 and the Knesset profile for Hadash http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=12. ^

9. Bedouin. Derived from the Arabic badawi, meaning “desert-dweller,” Bedouin is a general name for Arab nomadic groups. Once characterized by a nomadic and rural lifestyle, the Bedouins in Israel have largely become sedentary as a result of government policies toward them. Beginning in the 1960’s, the State of Israel has attempted to settle the Bedouin population in planned communities. Two major disputes between the Bedouin communities and the State of Israel persist: land ownership—many Bedouin do not have ownership papers for the land on which they have traditionally lived—and unrecognized villages. Unrecognized villages are those villages not recognized by the State of Israel although they generally predate the existence of the State, resulting in living conditions that do not benefit from state support for basic services and infrastructure. There are approximately 70,000 Bedouin living in 46 such unrecognized villages. The Bedouin population in Israel numbers approximately 200,000. They live primarily in the Negev desert and the Galilee. The Bedouin of the Negev are Israel’s most impoverished group, with the highest rates of unemployment. See Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History. London: Harvard University Press, 2003. See online Lynfield, Ben. “In Israel’s Desert, A Fight for Land,” The Christian Science Monitor. 20 Feb. 2003. 21 June 2007 See also “The Bedouins in Israel: A Special Report.” Nov. 1998. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel. 21 June 2001 ^

10. Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Also known as “Palestinian citizens of Israel,” “Palestinian Israelis,” “1948 Palestinians,” or “Arab Israelis.” Refers to those Palestinians and their descendents who remained in the area that became the State of Israel in 1948. They were granted Israeli citizenship. Until 1966 most of them were subjected to military rule that restricted their movement and some of their rights. The tension in Israel between its “Jewish” and “democratic” nature has historically meant that many Arab minority rights have been neglected. According to Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, since 1967, “The state [has] practiced systematic and institutionalized discrimination in all areas, such as land dispossession and allocation, education, language, economics, culture, and political participation.” While their standing in Israel has improved since Israel’s independence, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel experience periodic persecution, felt strongest during the October 2000 riots in which 13 Palestinian Arab Israelis were killed in ten days. In 2004, Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel made up approximately 18-19% of the Israeli population. They live within the State of Israel, participate in government and hold Israeli citizenship, but do not serve in the military. See Lustick, Ian S. “Palestinian Citizens of Israel.” Philip Mattar, ed. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2005 and Bligh, Alexander, ed. The Israeli Palestinians: an Arab Minority in the Jewish State. London: Frank Cass, 2003. See also Adala and Mossawa online at http://www.adalah.org/eng/ and http://www.mossawacenter.org ^

11. Palestine Liberation Organization. (Sorry, there was an error; this glossary term was not found.) ^

12. Oslo process. This process was unveiled with the signing of the Declaration of Principles ("DOP") by Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993, although it was preceded by an exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat. In those letters, Israel recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people and the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security. The DOP called for a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on United Nation Resolutions 242 and 338. It also led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority ("PA" or "PNA") as part of the 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement. Yasser Arafat became President of the PNA. A series of agreements between the Israeli government and the PNA followed. The agreements are known collectively as the Oslo Accords. The Oslo process took a serious blow with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, and by the failure of the Camp David Accords in 2000, but ended officially with the assumption of the second intifada in September 2000. For a text of the letters and the Declaration of Principles see: www.palestine-un.org or The Israeli Ministry of Foregin Affairs ^

13. Holocaust. The systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of millions of people, including six million Jews—approximately 1/3 of the world's Jewish population—by the Nazi regime and its collaborators. "Holocaust" is a word of Greek origin meaning "sacrifice by fire." The Nazis, who came to power in Germany in January 1933, believed that Germans were "racially superior" and deemed groups including Jews, Roma, the physically disabled and homosexuals to be "inferior" and thus unworthy of life. They devised what they considered to be the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question," which entailed the process of exterminating Jews. During the era of the Holocaust, the Nazis also persecuted Communists, Socialists and Jehovah's Witnesses. See the US Holocaust Memorial Museum website: http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/index.php?lang=en=10005143 ^

14. Gush Katif. Gush Katif was a bloc of 17 settlements in the southern Gaza strip. In August 2005, all 8,000 residents were removed from their homes as part of Israel's "disengagement" from the Gaza strip. See "Gaza disengagement" in glossary. ^

15. Checkpoints. Roadblock or military installation used by security forces to control and restrict pedestrian movement and vehicle traffic. The Israeli army makes widespread use of checkpoints in the Occupied Territories in order to control the movement of Palestinians between Palestinian cities and villages and between the Occupied Territories and Israel. They have been used on a few occasions to control some movement of Israeli settlers and Israeli citizens trying to enter Gaza and several West Bank settlements to protest Israeli disengagement from those territories. Checkpoints can be large and semi-permanent structures resembling simple basic border crossings (such as the Kalandia checkpoint between Ramallah and Jerusalem or the Hawara checkpoint between Nablus and Ramallah) or small, temporary impositions on roadways or outside towns or villages. The security forces at a checkpoint exercise total control over movement through the checkpoint. Depending upon the location of the checkpoint, soldiers may and often do check the identity papers of every vehicle passenger and/or pedestrian who wishes to pass through, and refuse passage to all who have not obtained permits from the Israeli military's Civil Administration in the Occupied Territories. Palestinians and Israeli observers cite frequent, if not routine, incidences of delay and harassment of Palestinian civilians at checkpoints, regardless of the status of their papers. There are currently checkpoints at the entry and exit points of every large Palestinian populated area in the West Bank, on every major road within the West Bank, and at every crossing point on the Green Line between Israel and the Occupied Territories, in addition to many smaller checkpoints within the West Bank. According to the IDF, a checkpoint is a "security mechanism to prevent the passage of terrorists from PA territory into Israel while maintaining both Israeli and Palestinian daily routine," used to "facilitate rapid passage of Palestinians while providing maximal security to Israeli citizens." For facts, figures, and maps on the web, see BBC , the Israeli NGO Machsom (checkpoint) Watch or The Palestinian Red Crescent ^

16. Nablus. A Palestinian city in the northern West Bank. Est. population 132,000. ^

17. Second Intifada. Intifada is Arabic for "shaking off." This refers to the recent Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. The second intifada began in September 2000 following the breakdown of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is sometimes called the Al-Aqsa (Aksa or 'Aqsa) Intifada or the Armed Intifada. See also: Intifada. ^

18. Gaza Strip. Geographical territory located on the Mediterranean Coast and bordering the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and Israel, with a total land mass of 360 sq km. Population: 1,376,289. The Palestinian populated territory was under Israeli administrative and military control from 1967 to 1994, when an agreement pursuant to the Declaration of Principles (DOP) gave the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) limited self-government for an interim five-year period, although Israel retained responsibility for external and internal security and for public order of settlements. Until August 2005, approximately 7000 Israeli settlers lived in the Strip. Negotiations aimed at determining final status of the West Bank and Gaza commenced in 1999, but were derailed by the second intifada in September 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw all troops and dismantle all settlements in the Gaza Strip and return the territory to PNA control was completed in August 2005, although Israel maintains control over air space and borders. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.html. ^

19. Hebron. A Palestinian city in the West Bank, located 30 kilometers south of Jerusalem. Al-Khalil ("Friend of God") in Arabic and Khevron in Hebrew, its population is approximately 160,000, the majority of whom are Palestinian Muslims, with approximately 400 Jewish settlers living in the center of the city and an Israeli military presence. The city is home to the Tomb of the Patriarchs, the supposed burial site of the biblical patriarchs and matriarchs. See 1929 Riots and Baruch Goldstein/Hebron Massacre. ^

20. HAMAS. (Arabic for "zeal" and an acronym for "Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya" or "Islamic Resistance Movement"). Inspired ideologically and organizationally by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and founded in 1987, HAMAS' long-term and declared aim is the destruction of the State of Israel in order to establish an Islamic state in all of the land of British mandatory Palestine. It uses political, social and militant means to further its goals, and claims responsibility for militant operations, including the use of suicide bombings that have killed hundreds of Israeli soldiers and civilians. The European Union and Israeli and American governments consider HAMAS to be a terrorist organization. HAMAS also provides charitable social and educational services, primarily in Gaza. It runs candidates in municipal elections and closed elections for university councils, trade union groups and nongovernmental organizations. The Israeli military has assassinated many of its political and military leaders in the last few years, including their spiritual leader and founder Sheikh Ahmad Isma'il Yassin and political/military leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi. HAMAS' success in recent Palestinian local elections (January 2005) has led some to speculate that the group is transforming from a primarily militant organization seeking an Islamic state over all of the land of British mandated Palestine to a political party focused on political control in the Palestinian Territories. For example, see Ben Lynfield. "Hamas Gains Political Clout," The Christian Science Monitor, 9 May 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0509/p01s03-wome.htm. For detailed analysis of the organization see http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=13 ^

21. Ben Gurion University of the Negev. See http://www.bgu.ac.il/ ^

22. Yeshiva. A school of Jewish religious study. ^

23. Kook, Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen.

 (1865-1935) was the first Chief Rabbi of Israel and founded the yeshiva Mercaz HaRav in Jerusalem. See a biography of Rabbi Kook at the Jewish Agency for Israel http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/people/BIOS/kook.html.

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24. British Mandate. The administrative, diplomatic and military mandate by Britain over Palestine between 1923 and 1947. Following World War I and the defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire, France and Britain set out to delineate spheres of influence in the Middle East. Pursuant to the informal Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Allied powers laid out details at the April 1920 San Remo Conference for formal mandated divisions. The mandate for Palestine was one of a number of mandates in the Middle East designed to formalize British and French administration in the newly formed countries of Syria and Lebanon and Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. The British mandate over Palestine was approved by the League of Nations Council on July 24, 1922, and declared official as of September 29, 1923. The mandate continued until 1947, when Britain sought the aid of the United Nations in determining the fate of the territory, which was at this time hotly disputed by both Zionist and Arab nationalist aspirations. British de facto rule in Palestine lasted from December 1917 to June 1948. See Library of Congress Country Studies at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html ^

25. Halacha.

The body of Jewish law and jurisprudence, based on the Talmud.

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26. Gaza Disengagement. Also referred to as "Disengagement," "the Pull Out," "the Withdrawal," "the Evacuation," "HaHitNatKut" in Hebrew. In the current conflict, this term refers to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's unilateral withdrawal of the Israeli army and Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip in August of 2005, although Israel maintains control over air space and borders. ^

27. Two-state solution. Refers to the notion of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state alongside a sovereign State of Israel. Has been the ostensible framework in Palestinian-Israeli peace talks since the Oslo process. Key disputed issues include: the actual boundaries of a nascent contemporary Palestine; the location of its capital; the nature of government; the type of economic relations with its neighbors; the handling of Palestinian refugees seeking repatriation or compensation; the degree of access to natural resources as well as control over borders; defense matters and air space. ^

28. Palestine. A historical territorial entity that comprises most of the territory of present-day Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. Palestine was among the several former Ottoman Arab territories which were placed under the administration of Great Britain under the Mandates System adopted by the League of Nations. However, under Ottoman rule, the territory of British mandated Palestine was not ruled as one distinctive administrative entity, rather, it "was divided between the provinces of Beirut and Damascus and the special administrative unit of Jerusalem." UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947) proposed the partitioning of Palestine into two independent states, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish. This proposal was not realized as Arab leaders regarded it as invalid. The State of Israel declared independence in 1948 on land in Palestine. The war that followed led to some of Palestine's territory being annexed by Israel and sections falling under Egyptian and Jordanian control. While the State of Palestine does not exist today, the term is used by many to refer alternatively to a future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, or the entire territory of British mandate Palestine. For quote, see William L. Cleveland. A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) p. 238. ^